## **Intelligence?**

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In a very specific way, intelligence and information-processing are synonymous.

Information-processing takes place between differently-scaled models of a relevant context. The way in which these models relate to each other, and therefore the result of an inter-scalar processing, depends on the constraints which are imposed on inter-scalar computation, and on the manner in which those constraints are applied.

Mono-scalar 'systems' can always be deconstructed more or less precisely to a set of rules: a single non-fragmented scale corresponds to a single formalization. Any consequent 'systemic' complexity is the result of formal incompleteness or of our lack of understanding.

Multi-scalar 'systems' constitute artificiallynaturally-constrained hierarchies, where the style of processing depends on whether the inter-scalar imposed constraints are externally internally recursively generated by information-processing itself. These two types of hierarchy, artificial and natural, have very different properties, and exhibit completely different styles of 'intelligence'.

The unification of a processing assembly into a 'system' is *always* through our intervention, whether at a single scale or across multiple scales of operation. If an artificial hierarchy is not to be scale-fragmented, it must possess some kind of cross-scalar coherence, imposed through our manipulation of the inter-scalar constraints. A natural hierarchy generates this cross-scalar coherence itself, through an autonomynegotiation between its various scales, creating a hyperscalar system.

This appears to be the 'meaning' of intelligence: it enables a multi-scalar system to operate as if it were simultaneously multi-scalar and mono-scalar. Different individual scales of operation retain a context-dependent degree of autonomy, but the entire assembly is unified at a hyperscalar level.

A 'system' is always hyperscalar, whether through artificially- or naturallyimposed constraints. It is questionable whether it would be possible to generate sufficient cross-scalar correlation in an artificial information-processing assembly to generate an interesting or useful degree of independent 'intelligence'. In any case, any attempt to do so in a definably-operating assembly such as a Boolean logic computer could only succeed if the logical definability were relaxed, either by intention or through the relativistic isolation of different parts of the assembly. Even then, artificial information-processing current mechanisms would be incapable of dealing non-catastrophically with the unpredictable structural incompletenesses.